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Comparative Negligence In California:
Multiple Party Litigation
In 1975, the California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.1
unilaterally adopted a system of pure comparative negligence.2 In so
doing, the court judicially abolished the doctrines of contributory negli-
gence,3 "unreasonable!' assumption of the risk,4 and last clear chance,5
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. The unilateral adoption of comparative negligence by the California Supreme
Court is interesting in view of prior unsuccessful attempts to amend California Civil
Code Section 1714 so as to provide for comparative negligence. These attempts include
A.B. 500 (Proposed Addition to Civil Code Section 6660), 586, 731, 1975-76 Regular
Session, which would have provided for a system of comparative negligence in which a
plaintiff must have been less than 50 percent responsible for the accident [hereinafter
referred to as a 50 percent system]; S.B. 494, 1975-76 Regular Session, which would
have provided for special verdicts and comparative negligence; S.B. 10 (Proposed
Addition to Civil Code Section 6660), 557, 2021, 2350, 2425, 1973-74 Regular Session,
which proposed a similar 50 percent system; A.B. 50 (Proposed Addition to Civil Code
Section 6660), 1666, 1973-74 Regular Session, which sought to create a 50 percent
system of comparative negligence; A.B. 102, 125 (Proposed Addition to Civil Code
Section 6660) and S.B. 40 (Proposed Addition to Civil Code Section 6660), 132, 384,
1493 (Proposed Addition to Civil Code Section 6660) 1972 Regular Session, which were
introduced to modify California Civil Code Section 1714; A.B. 694 and S.B. 43, 1971
Regular Session, which would have provided for a 50 percent system; A.B. 2895, 1961
Regular Session, which would have provided for a system of pure comparative negli-
gence; S.B. 845, 1957 Regular Session, which would have provided for mandatory special
verdicts and a system of pure comparative negligence; A.B. 1845 and S.B. 1063, 1955
Regular Session, which proposed pure comparative negligence; A.B. 406, 779 and S.B.
1492, 1953 Regular Session, which were introduced to provide a system of pure
comparative negligence; A.B. 1310, 1951 Regular Session, which attempted to enact a 50
percent system of negligence; and A.B. 909, 1941 Regular Session, which also proposed a
50 percent system of comparative negligence.
One possible conclusion from the prior proposed legislation is that the legislature was
uncertain as to the potential scope of California Civil Code Section 1714. Another
possible interpretation is that the legislature did not want to modify the common law
defense of contributory negligence.
3. 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. "Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which
he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-
operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."
R EATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §463 (1965); 13 Cal. 3d at 809, 532 P.2d at 1230,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 862. A pure comparative negligence system diminishes the damages
awarded a plaintiff in proportion to his fault. Thus, if in P's suit against D, P is found
to have suffered $10,000 in damages and is found to have been 20 percent at fault, P wil
recover $8000.
4. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The Li court
repudiated that portion of the defense of assumption of the risk, similar to contributory
negligence, where a plaintiff unreasonably assumes a particular known risk. Id. at 824-
25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
5. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The last clear chance
doctrine describes those situations in which a defendant had the last clear opportunity to
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thus concluding a protracted assault on these doctrines by numerous
courts and commentators. While certainly injecting a greater element
of fairness into California tort law, the Li case raises a number of sub-
stantive and procedural problems which must be addressed by the courts
and the legislature.
The implementation of a system of comparative negligence should
affect the existing doctrines of contribution and indemnity and the rules
of joinder of parties and causes of action. Hence, this comment will
consider potential problems arising in the specific context of multiple
party suits. First, the comment will examine the application of compar-
ative negligence in single party and multiple party suits.7 Second, it will
consider the effect of comparative negligence on the doctrines of contri-
bution and indemnity.' Third, since all parties may not be present and
all issues may not be resolved in a single suit, the impact of pure
comparative negligence upon the doctrines of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and the rules of joinder of parties and causes of action, insofar
as they affect subsequent suits, will be examined.9 Finally, after deline-
ating the significant impacts of the adoption of comparative negligence
on these issues, proposals for legislative reform will be advanced. 10
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN SINGLE PARTY SUITS
The most basic application of comparative negligence concerns the
situation in which the plaintiff, injured solely by the act of one defen-
dant, sues that defendant for property damage and/or personal injury.
Of course, the plaintiff must still allege and -prove the traditional elements
of actionable negligence: duty, breach of duty, legal cause, and dam-
ages."1 In pre-comparative negligence cases, the defendant would often
allege that plaintiff's negligence was a contributory cause of the accident
so as to bar the plaintiffs recovery.-" Under a system of comparative
negligence, a defendant will still wish to allege plaintiff's negligent
avoid the harm and did not do so. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
427-33 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
6. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953);
Comment, Torts-The Theory and Operation of Comparative Negligence, 22 S. CAL. L.
REv. 276 (1949). For a general consideration of various arguments, both for and
against comparative negligence, see Duniway, California Should Adopt A "Comparative
Negligence" Law, 28 CAL. ST. B.J. 22 (1953); McKinnon, The Case Against Compara-
tive Negligence, 28 CAL. ST. B.J. 23 (1953). See also McWilliams, On Amending Our
Law of Contributory Negligence, 24 CAL. ST. B.J. 66 (1953); Yager, Justice Expedited-
A Ten-Year Summary, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 57, 70-73 (1960).
7. See text accompanying notes 11-42 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 43-116 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 117-200 infra.
10. See statutory proposal following the conclusion infra.
11. See BooK OF APPROVED JURY INSMrUMcTONS, Nos. 3.00, 3.50, 14.90 (1975
Revision) [hereinafter cited as BAJI].
12. PROSSER, supra note 5, §65, at 417, §67 at 433.
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conduct because it may serve to reduce the amount of recovery. 13 The
court in Li made no express reference to the manner in which the
plaintiff's alleged negligence should be raised by the defendant, but in
view of existing case law in other pure comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions, it appears that the defendant bears the burden of pleading and
proving that the plaintiffs negligence was also a proximate cause of the
injury.'" This analysis is consistent with existing California case law
requiring the defendant -to persuade the trier of fact that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent.' 5
Assuming the defendant has raised this issue, the manner in which
the trier of fact is to evaluate the evidence and make findings becomes
important. The Li court noted that juries, in evaluating comparative
fault, may be tempted to average each juror's estimate of the plaintiff's
fault and render a quotient verdict.'" Quotient verdicts are inappro-
priate for two reasons: first, the verdict is not founded upon collective
reasoning, discussion, or deliberation; and second, a quotient verdict
enables a juror who recommends an unreasonably small or large figure
to exert inordinate and unfair influence upon the determination of the
quotient. A quotient verdict thus may be substantially disproprotionate
to the judgment of almost all other jurors, who are nevertheless bound
by the antecedent agreement to accept the quotient as their verdict.'1
The Li majority felt, however, that this problem could be overcome
'through the use of either special verdicts or interrogatories to the jury.'8
Various forms of these special verdict questions and interrogatories do
exist, but generally the trier of fact is asked to (1) determine whether
the plaintiff was negligent, and, if so, whether that negligence was a
proximate cause of his injuries; (2) determine whether the defendant
was negligent, and, if so, whether that negligence was a proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries; (3) assuming that the negligence of both
parties caused all of the plaintiff's injuries, estimate the percentage of
13. V. ScHwAR='z, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §17.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWAR7z].
14. See, e.g., Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Lucken, 137 Miss. 572, 592-93, 102 So. 393,
398 (1925); Jefferson Funeral Home v. Pinson, 219 Miss. 427, 436, 69 So. 2d 234, 238
(1954); Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Campbell, 114 Miss. 803, 820, 75 So. 554, 560 (1917).
15. See, e.g., Gyerman v. U.S. Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 498 P.2d 1043, 1051,
102 Cal. Rptr. 795, 803 (1972); Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Cal. 2d 814, 818, 155 P.2d 826,
829 (1945).
16. 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872; see also ScHwARTz,
supra note 13, §17.1.
17. See Annot, 8 A.L.R.3d 335, 347-48 (1966).
18. 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The argument that
the use of special verdicts would require amendment of Civil Code of Procedure Section
625 (special findings may be made at the court's discretion) was stated to pose no
problem at the present. Id. at 824 n.18, 532 P.2d at 1240 n.18, 119 Cal. Rptr. 872 n.18.
The court could resolve the matter differently in the future, however.
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fault attributable -to each party; and (4) determine the amount of
damage that the plaintiff has suffered. 9
This procedure has not gone without criticism. One commentator
has stated that asking the jury to make a determination of the percent-
age of fault ascribable to each party is calling for an arbitrary distinction
without a difference.20 Another has noted that since special verdict
questions are written in general terms, all the material ultimate facts of
the case may not be included.2 ' Notwithstanding these criticisms, the
special verdict procedure has been hailed as properly focusing the jury's
inquiry through separation of the question as to damages and degree of
fault, facilitating appellate review, and serving to isolate troublesome
issues such as the proportionate causation of each party.22  Therefore,
they should become an integral part of a comparative negligence system.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN MULTIPLE PARTY SUITS
Frequently the plaintiff has been damaged through the combined ac-
tivity of two or more tortfeasors. The following discussion considers the
problems associated with multiple party litigation and assumes that all
interested persons are before the court as parties. In order to attain a
basic understanding of -these problems, it will be helpful to consider a
hypothetical case.
Perhaps the most common situation illustrative of these actions is the
multiple automobile collision. P is stopped at an intersection. D1,
negligently strikes P's car, which is pushed into an intersection where
D2, who is negligently making a turn, also strikes P's auto. Several
lawsuits could potentially arise out of this incident:
1. P v. D1, for negligence;
23
2. P v. D2, for negligence;
24
3. D2 v. Di, for negligence;
25
4. D, v. D2, for contribution;2 6 or
5. D, or D2 v. P, for negligence.27
19. See BAJI, supra note 11, Nos. 3.00, 3.50, 14.93, 14.94, 14.95, 14.96 (1975
Revision); ScnwA.Tz, supra note 13, §17.4. If the defendant suffers damage, as the
result of the plaintiff's activity, the procedure described in the text would be applied in
terms of the defendant. The court could then setoff damages.
20. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tort!easors, 41 S. CAL. L. REV.
728, 747 (1968).
21. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, §17.4, at 288.
22. See McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chems., 20 Cal. App. 3d 928, 936-37, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 910, 915-16 (1971); SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, § 17.4, at 289.
23. See text following note 30 infra.
24. See text following note 30 infra.
25. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
26. See text following note 88 infra.
27. See note 19 supra and text accompanying note 31 infra.
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In any of these suits the trier of fact must first determine the degree of
negligence and causation to be ascribed to each party,28 and then
allocate responsibility for the accident between the plaintiff and defend-
ant.29 With respect to the latter determination, the plaintiff's fault
should be compared against the combined negligence of both defendants
under a system of pure comparative negligence. a0 The following analy-
sis is then applied by the trier of fact: (1) A determination is made as to
the amount of damages the plaintiff has suffered; (2) If the defendants
have counterclaimed for damages, the trier of fact first determines
whether the damages were proximately caused by the negligence of the
plaintiff, and then calculates the net liability of each party to all other
parties by reducing the award of counterclaim damages to the defendant
by the proprotionate fault of that defendant.
28. See BAi, supra note 11, Nos. 3.00, 3.50, 14.90, 14.91, 14.93, 14.94, 14.95,
14.96 (1975 Revision); C. HEur AND C. J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENcE MANUAL
§1.70, at 26-31 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HEFT]. Identical questions would be posed
for all remaining parties. See generally Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the
Special Verdict, 5 ST. MARY's L.. 688 (1974); Panel on Instructions and Special
Verdicts Under Comparative Negligence, 10 ARK. L. REv. 94 (1955).
29. See BAI, supra note 11, Nos. 3.00, 3.50, 14.90, 14.91, 14.93, 14.94, 14.95,
14.96 (1975 Revision); HEFr, supra note 28, § 1.70, at 26-31.
30. See BAlI, supra note 11, Nos. 14.90, 14.91, 14.93, 14.94, 14.95, 14.96, 15.13,
15.14, 15.16, 15.17, 15.18, 15.19 (1975 Revision).
There is some difficulty, however, under a so-called "50 percent" or modified compara-
tive negligence system. Under this system a plaintiff must be less negligent than the
defendant or defendants before recovery is allowed. In these jurisdictions, a split of
authority exists as to whether a plaintiff's fault should be compared with that of the
combined negligence of all defendants. Those courts which refuse to combine the
negligence of the defendants have reasoned that under their existing statutory language,
it would be incompatible with the state's comparative negligence system to allow a
plaintiff to recover from a defendant who is less at fault than the plaintiff. Compare
Ross v. Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936) and Walker v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934) (both cases holding that the plaintiff's
negligence may not be compared with the combined negligence of all defendants) with
Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841 (1973).
However, some of the courts which refuse to combine the negligence of the defendants
make an exception to this rule if there is a common relationship between the tortfeasors.
E.g., Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973).
The rule that the negligence of the defendants may not be combined appears
particularly unjust in those cases where the combined acts of the defendants have caused
a single indivisible injury to the plaintiff. See Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp.
Corp., 41 Wis. 2d 661, 165 N.W.2d 162 (1969). First, the rule undercuts the principle
of joint and several liability of joint, concurrent, or successive tortfeasors for all
proximately caused harm occasioned to the plaintiff, irrespective of source. Second, if,
for example, a plaintiff is found to be 40 percent at fault and sues defendants D1 and D2
who are each 30 percent responsible for the accident, the plaintiff is left witho't a
remedy for an injury that was caused largely (60 percent) by the negligence of other
persons.
The rule against combining the negligence of the defendants has already been
criticized by members of a supreme court of a state which follows the rule. See Gross v.
Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 52-53, 212 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (1973) (Wilkie & Beilfuss, J.J.,
concurring; Hallows, C.J., dissenting in part).
For the aforementioned reasons, the California system of pure comparative negligence
should permit a comparison of a plaintiff's negligence against the combined negligence of
all defendants. Other states do permit a comparison of the plaintiff's negligence against
the combined negligence of all defendants. Nnv. REv. STAT. §41.141 §§1, 2(a) (1975);
TEx. Clv. STAT. ANN. Art. 2212a §§1, 2 (1975). For a further discussion of these
problems, see ScnwA Tz, supra note 13, §16.6 at 258-60.
774
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The following examples demonstrate these principles.
Example One. Plaintiff is 10 percent at fault, Defendant D1 is 40
percent at fault, and Defendant D2 is 50 percent at fault. Plaintiff is
found to have suffered $10,000 in damages. The maximum that
Plaintiff can recover from D1 and D2 is $9000. This amount is comput-
ed by deducting the percentage of the damage occasioned by -the plain-
tiff's own negligence.
Example Two. Plaintiff is found to be 10 percent at fault and to
have suffered $10,000 in damages; Defendant D, is found to be 40
percent at fault and to have suffered $2000 in damages; Defendant D2 is
found to be 50 percent at fault and to have suffered $5000 in damages.
The maximum that Plaintiff can recover is $9000; the maximum that
D1 can recover is $1200; the maximum that D2 can recover is $2500.
Defendants D, and D2 are jointly liable to the Plaintiff for $9000;
Plaintiff and D2 are jointly liable to D, for $1200; Plaintiff and D1 are
jointly liable to D2 for $2500. 31
With this basic understanding of the mechanics which are used to
determine the relative liabilities of the various parties, the inquiry must
be directed to the issue of who bears the responsibility for payment of
the damage award. In a suit involving only one defendant, the answer
is obvious: the sole defendant pays the entire amount. However, where
there are jointly liable parties, the problem becomes more complex.
A. Joint and Several Liability of Tortfeasors
Under existing California law, where the activity of two or more
persons has combined to cause an indivisible injury to another, the
injured party may seek compensation from either tortfeasor individual-
1y32 or from both in a single proceeding in accord with the principle of
joint and several liability.33 Joint and several liability is imposed in
situations in which tortfeasors have acted concertedly or independently
to cause an injury. Where two or more persons have acted in concert as
joint tortfeasors, the basis of liability can be explained in terms of a joint
enterprise, each party having acted with a common purpose so that the
31. As to the question of the amounts the parties should pay in discharging the
judgment and the final setoff of damages, see text following note 88 infra.
32. E.g., Linberg v. Stanto, 211 Cal. 771, 774, 297 P. 9, 10 (1931); Gosliner v.
Briones, 187 Cal. 557, 563, 204 P. 19, 22 (1921); Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App.
2d 209, 213, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463-64 (1962); Waterhouse-Wilcox Co. v. Betz &
Mabrey, 73 Cal. App. 236, 240, 238 P. 763, 765 (1925).
33. See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32
(1950) (joint tortfeasors); Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 506,
111 P. 534, 537 (1910) (concurrent tortfeasors); CAL. Cona Civ. fPoc. §§379, 427.10.
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act of one is the act of all.3 4  Where two or more persons have acted
independently, either concurrently or successively, to cause an indivisi-
ble injury, liability is predicated on the basis that each tortfeasor's
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the loss and on the
impracticality of apportioning that loss.3 5
This rule of law is the product of various public policy considerations.
There are two major concerns in any tort case where liability has been
established: compensation for an injured plaintiff, and the assessment of
reasonable liability on the defendant for the amount of damages he has
caused. In non-comparative negligence jurisdictions, the courts have
determined that the plaintiff's interest in compensation is more impor-
tant than the defendant's interest in being held liable only for that
portion of the damage which he has caused. Thus, despite arguments
to the contrary, no allowance is made for damage caused by a concur-
rent act of God or of a nonparty tortfeasor.36 The only recognized
exception arises where the act of God or of the absent person has caused
the plaintiff to suffer a totally unforeseeable loss, 37 thereby superseding
the defendant's negligent act as a proximate cause of the injury.3 As a
result of the plaintiff's predominant interest in compensation for his
injury, joint tortfeasors are held to be jointly and severally liable for the
plaintiff's injury. Hence, if one defendant does not pay his proportion-
ate part of the judgment, the other defendant is compelled to pay the
entire amount, even though the latter's negligent act may have been of
minor consequence in comparison to that of the former.
B. Joint and Several Liability Under Comparative Negligence
There is some question whether the imposition of joint and several
liability should be continued under a system of pure comparative negli-
gence. If the policy underlying the concept of joint and several liability
is largely a result of the impracticality of apportionment,30 the compara-
tive negligence system seems to cure this problem since the trier of fact
34. See, e.g., Unruh v. Truck Ins..Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 631, 498 P.2d 1065, 1074,
102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825-26 (1972); Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d
501, 515, 86 P.2d 102, 109 (1939); Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 106-07, 196 P.
25, 34 (1921); Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 301, 193 P. 943, 946 (1920); Black v.
Sullivan, 48 Cal. App. 3d 557, 566-67, 122 Cal. Rptr. 119, 1 (1975); F. HAPRn & F.
JAmEs, THE LAW OF TORTS, §10.1, at 692 (1956); PRossER, supra note 5, §46, at 291.
35. See Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32
(1950); PROSSEpR, supra note 5, §52, at 315-16; Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 15 S. CAL.
L. REv. 427, 439-42 (1942).
36. PRossER, supra note 5, §52, at 315-16; HEFT supra note 28, §8.131 at 73-75
(Supp. 1975); HEFr, supra note 28, §1.40 at 13 (1971).
37. See PRossER, supra note 5, §44, at 284-86.
38. See id. at 270-89.
39. Id. §52, at 315-16.
1976 / Multiple Party Litigation
must specifically estimate the amount of fault attributable to each party.
In addition, to the extent that the general policy of comparative negli-
gence is probably that of allowing a claimant to recover those damages
not caused by his own negligence, the argument can be made -that a
defendant should be liable only for those damages caused by his negli-
gent act. In fact, this seems to be the whole purpose of apportioning
fault between plaintiff and defendant.
However, the courts which have considered this question have refused
to abandon joint and several liability.40 Although no reason for the
retention of this policy has been advanced by these courts, one can infer
that the plaintiff's interest in full compensation continues to outweigh a
defendant's interest in being held liable for more damage than he has
caused. In addition, it should be remembered that in a joint tortfeasor
situation, each defendant's activity was a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiff's injury. Another rationale might be a distinction between
the relationship of the plaintiff with respect to the defendants and that of
the defendants inter se. In terms of providing compensation to an
injured party, the fact that one defendant might be forced to pay more
than his share is collateral to the recovery of the injured party and
should be litigated between the defendants in terms of contribution or
indemnification after the plaintiff has been compensated. If joint and
several liability is abandoned, a claimant will not be able to receive
compensation for those damages attributable to a tortfeasor unable to
discharge his share of the judgment. Therefore, it can be persuasively
argued that there remain strong policy considerations in favor of joint
and several liability, notwithstanding the introduction of a system of
comparative negligence.
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
Assuming a joint judgment is rendered against multiple defendants,
there is some question as to the exact responsibility of the defendants
inter se. If one party is unable to pay the award, the remaining party or
parties may have to discharge the entire judgment in order to avoid
execution on that judgment. To provide some equitable method of
allocation of loss among defendants, and to avoid the potential injustice
of holding one party solely responsible for an injury that was occasioned
40. See, e.g., Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 348 9 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1940);
Saucier v. Walker, 203 So. 2d 299, 302-03 (Miss. 1967); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1973) (after this
decision, the New York Legislature expressly retained the principle of joint and several
liability as part of the new comparative contribution statute; N.Y.C.P.L.R. §1404
(McKinney 1975-76)); Caldwell v. Piggly-Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis. 2d 447, 460,
145 N.W.2d 745, 752-53 (1966).
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at least partly by the activity of another, the doctrines of contribution
and indemnity have been formulated. 41  The major difference in loss
allocation between contribution and indemnity is that indemnity shifts
the entire burden of the loss onto one party while contribution shifts
only a portion.42
A. Contribution and Indemnity Before Comparative Negligence
1. Contribution
Notwithstanding the common law rule barring contribution among
joint tortfeasors,43 most jurisdictions today allow contribution as the
result of legislative" or judicial 5 action. In jurisdictions which do not
follow the doctrine of comparative negligence, contribution is accom-
plished on a pro rata basis, 46 the share of each defendant being deter-
mined simply by dividing the total damages by the number of responsi-
ble defendants.47 Any party who has paid more than his pro rata share
of a judgment has a cause of action against any party who has not paid
his share.48 Most courts also follow the rule that contribution is not
dependent on the degree of participation in the wrong.49
The current California contribution statute50 does not recognize a
claim for contribution until a party has discharged more than his pro
rata share of a joint judgment rendered against him and another defen-
dant.5" A defendant may obtain judgment for contribution in the origi-
41. See F. HAIR'ER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw oF TORTS, §10.2, at 717 (1956);
PRossEn, supra note 5, §50, at 307; Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California,
57 CAL. L. REV. 490, 490-502 (1969). See also Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 21 CRNELL L.Q. 552 (1935-36); Gregory, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HA{v. L. REv. 1170 (1941); Hodges, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEx. L. REv. 150 (1947); James, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HAv. L. REV. 1156 (1941); James,
Replication, 54 HARv. L. Rlv. 1178 (1941).
42. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492
(1964); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
305 (1962); Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379,
383 (1960); Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CLARA LAwYER 159, 160-
61 (1968).
43. See PRoSSER, supra note 5, §50, at 305.
4-4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §604.01 (1975); Tnx. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art.
2212a, §2 (1975).
45. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Maine 1971); Bielski v.
Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
46. See PRossER, supra note 5, §50 at 310.
47. See id.
48. See CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. §875(c).
49. See Mox Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677-78, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927);
Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d 278, 293, 295 P.2d 113, 123 (1956) (joint
tortfeasors); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 190 (1973) (concurrent or successive tortfea-
sors).
50. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §§875-880 (§875, added, CAL. STATs. 1957, c. 1700, at
3076 §1, §876-880, added, CAL. STAT. 1957, c. 1700, at 3077, §1).
51. See General Elec. Co. v. California ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App.
3d 918, 925-26, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 547-48 (1973); CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. §875.
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nal proceeding brought by the injured party upon notice to all interested
parties. 2 This right has not been expanded, however, to encompass a
contingent claim for contribution brought before the entry of judg-
ment.53 Therefore, by definition, no right of contribution can lie
against a tortfeasor who was not made a party to a suit or even against a
co-defendant before entry of judgment.
2. Indemnity
While the doctrine of contribution presupposes that the parties are
equal in legal fault and therefore liable on a pro rata basis, the doctrine
of indemnity imposes liability solely on one person.54 The right of
indemnity is not affected by the California contribution statute, 5 and
may be expressly provided for or implied by law.56
Under California law a party is free to obtain an indemnification
agreement against negligence. 57  These express indemnification agree-
ments may be in any form desired by the parties, provided that there is a
writing which complies with the California Statute of Frauds. 58 The
courts have generally upheld such agreements without modification; 9
however, an ambiguous agreement will not be construed to create a right
of indemnity.60 Express indemnity agreements should not be disturbed
52. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §878.
53. See General Elec. Co. v. California ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d
918, 926, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 548 (1973); Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 550-
52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-99 (1963).
54. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492
(1964); Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 376, 25 Cal. Rptr.
301, 305 (1962); Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr.
379, 383 (1960); Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CLMR& LAWYER 159,
160-61 (1968).
55. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §875(f).
56. See Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CL.A LAwYER, 159, 159-
60 (1968).
57. E.g. John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d 835, 839, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 844, 847 (1966). The courts have determined that if the indemnification
agreement appears in an adhesion contract or is against public policy it will not be
upheld; see Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963). See generally Comment, Contractual Exculpation From Tort Liability
in California-The "True Rule" Steps Forward, 52 CAL. L. REv. 350, 352 (1964).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE §1624(2).
59. See, e.g., Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 816 (1967); John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d 835, 844,
51 Cal. Rptr. 844, 850 (1966). See also Conley & Sayre, Indemnity Revisited:
Insurance of the Shifting Risk, 22 HAsr. L.J. 1201, 1231 (1971). The most typical
agreements are those contained in insurance or building contracts. See PROSSER, supra
note 5, §82 at 542-43.
60. See Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377,
379, 41 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964); Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 54 Cal.
2d 445, 447-48, 353 P.2d 924, 926-27, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286-87 (1960); Vinnell Co. v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 52 Cal. 2d 411, 415, 340 P.2d 604, 607 (1959); Dart Transp. Serv. v.
Mack Trucks, 9 Cal. App. 3d 837, 847-49, 88 Cal. Rptr. 670, 677-78 (1970); Whitmire
v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 261 Cal. App. 2d 594, 599-602, 68 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80-82 (1968);
John E. Branagh & Sons v. Witcosky, 242 Cal. App. 2d 835, 839, 51 Cal. Rptr. 844, 847
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by comparative negligence since persons subject to certain risks should
be free to protect themselves from liability."'
The form of indemnity which is more often encountered is equitable
or implied indemnity. Although there is no universal rule, 62 implied
indemnity is usually applied in situations where there is an extreme
disproportion in the relative culpability of the parties. 8 The court
consequently looks for disparities in the levels of culpability of the
parties in assessing liability,64 rather than for a breach of the underlying
contract as in express indemnity situations.6 5
To determine whether a party may be indemnified, the courts have
inquired whether that person in some manner participated in the
wrong.66 In attempting to describe the differences in the types of
conduct, terms such as active and passive negligence, or primary and
secondary liability, have been utilized.67 Thus, a person who has been
an active participant in a wrong may not obtain indemnification. 8
Active participation generally consists of either personal participation in
an affirmative act of negligence or physical connection with an act or
omission which the claimant for indemnification may have undertaken
by agreement.69 On the other hand, mere nonfeasance, or passive
negligence, will not prevent a party from obtaining indemnification.7"
(1966); King v. Timber Structures, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 181-82, 49 Cal. Rptr.
414, 417 (1966).
61. None of the reported cases allowing comparative contribution involved an
express indemnity situation. It should be noted, however, that under general freedom of
contract principles, parties should be permitted to apportion their respective responsibili-
ties.
62. Prosser was of the opinion that it is extremely difficult to state any general rule
or principle. See PRossER, supra note 5, §51, at 313. One commentator has noted that
indemnity may be granted in the following situations: (1) where a party has been held
liable solely on the basis of imputed or vicarious liability; (2) where a party has
performed, at the direction of another, an act not manifestly wrong; (3) where a party
has incurred liability as a consequence of reliance on a supplier of goods' duty of care; or
(4) where a party has incurred liability for failure to correct a hazardous condition,
which as between indemnitor and indemnitee, it was the duty of the indemnitor to make
safe. Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973). See also Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1355, 1356-57
(1963).
63. See PRossER, supra note 5, §51, at 311-13.
64. See Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortjeasors, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 728, 746 (1968).
65. See Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 379-80, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 308 (1962).
66. See id.
67. See PROSSER, supra note 5, §51, at 312-13.
68. E.g., American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d
520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
69. See Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 159, 172(1968). Thus, where a claimant for indemnity negligently drove a truck into a truck
operated by defendant's employees and injured them, the court rejected the claim on the
grounds of active participation. American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco,
202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962).
70. See Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 380-83, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 308-10 (1962).
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The preceding discussion evidences the fact that contribution and
indemnity evolved to more fairly allocate the loss among tortfeasors. The
approach of both doctrines is mechanical and neither provides an esti-
mation of the causation attributable to each person, a purportedly
elusive concept. Thus, in situations where there is an extreme dispor-
portion in the persons' respective participation, justice supposedly re-
quires liability to be shifted entirely onto one person. Likewise, in
cases where both persons are active participants, equality of liability is
felt to be equitable. 1 It must be noted that equality is not necessarily
equity-one party may have been much more responsible than another
for an injury. Hence, the doctrines of contribution and indemnity
cannot be said to solve complex liability questions in all circumstances.
B. Contribution and Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence
1. Comparative Contribution
The courts' difficulties in delineating the parties' degree of participa-
tion permits the inference that fairness may require the trier of fact to
determine the relative liability of the wrongdoers in terms of quantity.
The formulation of comparative negligence thus raises the question of
whether there should be comparative contribution; that is, whether a
defendant should ultimately be held liable only for those damages
caused directly by his own negligence. 72 The great majority of compar-
ative negligence jurisdictions consider comparative fault in contribution
actions, 73 either under direct provisions in the comparative negligence
statutes74 or by virtue of separate legislation.75
Prior to the Li decision, only one California appellate court had
followed the rule of comparative contribution.70 Unfortunately, the
appeal of this decision was dismissed at the request of the parties after a
hearing had been granted by the supreme court.77  However, support
for the argument that the California Supreme Court might at a later date
71. See PROSSER, supra note 5, §50, at 310; Braun, Contribution: A Fresh Look, 50
CAL. ST. B.J. 166, 169 (1975).
72. The liability of the defendants inter se is to be distinguished from the liability
of the defendants to the plaintiff. The defendants' proportionate causation is not
relevant to liability with respect to the plaintiff. See text following notes 40 supra.
73. Out of the 28 jurisdictions that follow systems of comparative negligence only 4
states, Colorado, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Utah, refuse to allow comparative contribu-
tion. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, §§16.7-16.8.
74. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §6-803 (1975); M4NN. STAT. ANN. §604.01 subd. 1
(1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:15-5.3 (1975).
75. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ArN. §34-1002 (1962 Repl.); Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§1.7.3(c) (1975).
76. See City of Sausilito v. Ryan, 65 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1968).
77. The dismissal of this case was noted in Kerr Chems., Inc. v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1016, 99 Cal. Rptr. 162, 165 (1971).
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allow comparative contribution is found in the language of Li.7" Al-
though discussing the distinctions between wilful and wanton miscon-
duct and ordinary negligence, the court stated that "a comprehensive
system of comparative negligence should allow for apportionment of
damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being
intentional. ' 79  At -the present time, however, the California contribu-
tion statute"0 would appear to preclude comparative contribution for
two reasons. First, the statute requires payment of more than a pro rata
share before a right to contribution may arise.81 Second, the pro rata
'share is determined by simply dividing the judgment equally among the
responsible defendants, not on the basis of proportionate liability. "
The California Supreme Court could follow the approach of New
York's highest court, which judicially adopted comparative contribution.
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,8 3 the New York court considered a
products liability case that could have been characterized as involving
either contribution or indemnity. In Dole, the defendant, D1, asserted a
third party claim for indemnity against a tortfeasor, D2, who had not
been named as a defendant by the plaintiff. The court held that if Di
was found negligent, D's negligence could also be considered either in
the same or in another action.8 4 It is important to note that the court
stated that D2 could be liable to D, either for a specific proportion of the
judgment or for the full amount, even though it labeled this concept as
a form of indemnity. 5  In reality, the Dole court did not follow the
principles of indemnity or of pro rata contribution; it adopted compara-
tive contribution." The court reached this result notwithstanding a
New York contribution statute which was virtually identical to that of
California. 87  The court avoided the statute by construing it to be
applicable only where there was no apportionment of liability contained
in the judgment.8 8 Hence, under the court's unique analysis, Di was
78. See Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 873 (1975).
79. Id.
80. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §875.
81. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §875(c). See Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 272,
363 P.2d 873, 874, 14 Cal. Rptr. 641, 642 (1961); Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d
542, 551-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 397-99 (1962).
82. See CAL. CODE Crv. PROc. §876.
83. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
84. Id. at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88.
85. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
86. Subsequently, the New York Court expressly allowed comparative contribution
on the basis of the Dole decision. See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25,
29-30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854-55 (1972).
87. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. §1401 (McKinney 1972). After Dole, the New York
Legislature amended the contribution statute so as to allow comparative contribution by
impleader and allowed subsequent suits for comparative contribution by removing thejoint judgment requirement. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1401-1403 (McKinney 1975).
88. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391.
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entitled either to pro rata contribution or to what the court referred to as
indemnity, but not both. Presumably, absent legislative reform, Cali-
fornia could also adopt comparative contribution by judicial action.
The utility of a system of comparative contribution is shown by
reference to the following example. Plaintiff, P, is 10 percent at fault
and is found to have sustained $10,000 in damages; Defendant DI is
found to be 40 percent at fault and to have suffered $2000 in damages;
Defendant )2 is found to be 50 percent at fault and to have suffered
$5000 in damages. The maximum amount P can recover is $9000.
This amount is computed by deducting the percentage of damages
attributable to P's negligence. Similarly, the maximum that D, can
recover is $1200 and the maximum that )2 can recover is $2500.
To resolve the issues presented by the example, a court should
consider the case as involving three separate sutts: in each suit, the
injured party sues the other two parties for damages.
Suit One-P v. D, and D2. Examining P's negligence, 90 percent of
the cause of the accident is attributable to the negligence of the defend-
ants, and hence they will be liable for 90 percent of P's damages.
Assuming both defendants are able to pay the judgment directly to P,
D, should be liable for that portion of the damages occasioned by his
negligence; -that is 40% of $9000, or $4000. )2 should be responsible90%
for 500 of $9000, or $5000.90%
Suit Two-D v. P and D2. Applying the same analysis as was used
in Suit One, 60 percent of the cause of the accident is attributable to the
negligence of the other parties if the negligence of D, is excluded. P
should thus be liable for that portion of the damages attributable to his
negligence; that is -0o of $1200, or $200. D2 should be responsible60%
for 50T of $1200, or $1000.60%
Suit Three-D2 v. P and D1. Again applying the same rationale
used in Suits One and Two, 50 percent of the cause of the accident is
attributable to the negligence of the other parties if Di's negligence is
excluded. P should be liable for that portion of the damages attributa-
ble to his negligence; that is, 10' of $2500, or $500. Di should be lia-
50%
ble for 40% of $2500, or $2000.50%
To illustrate how comparative contribution differs from pro rata
contribution, it should be assumed that in Suit One, D. is compelled to
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pay the entire $9000 judgment. Pursuant to the present California
contribution statute, D1 would be entitled to only $4500 from D2, not
the full $5000, because of the pro rata requirement. However, under
comparative contribution, D1 would be entitled to $5000 from D2
because this amount reflects the latter's percentage of liability, even
though it is disproportionate to the percentage of liability attributable to
Di. Hence a policy of comparative contribution will achieve an equita-
ble result between the defendants inter se in the situation where one
tortfeasor has been compelled to discharge more than his share of the
joint judgment, while still ensuring that the plaintiff will be fully com-
pensated for his damages under the principle of joint and several
liability.
One final matter which could concern the courts under a comparative
negligence system is the problem of setoffs. The result of the setoff
procedure with respect to the foregoing hypothetical would be as fol-
lows: P is owed $4000 and $5000 by Defendants Di and )2, respective-
ly. However, P owes Defendants D, and D2 $200 and $500, respective-
ly. Therefore Ps net recovery is $3800 from D, and $4500 from D2,
for a total recovery of $8300. By the same token, D. owes D2 $2000
and D2 owes D. $1000. A setoff of these amounts would leave D, still
owing D2 $1000. It is important to note that the problem of setoffs
would not present itself in a jurisdiction which does not follow compara-
tive negligence, as all parties would be barred from recovery by their
own contributory negligence.
2. Indemnity
Before Li, the California courts, in delineating the respective levels of
the defendants' culpability for purposes of indemnity, followed the case
of Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe 9 which refused to adopt any rule of
comparative neglgence.90 The reason for this refusal, as stated by the
court in McCabe, was that
[t]he difference between primary and secondary liability is not
based on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine
of comparative negligence,-a doctrine which, indeed, is not recog-
nized by the common law . . . . It depends on a difference in
the character or kind of the wrongs which cause the injury and in
the nature of the legal obligation owed by each of the wrongdoers
to the injured person. . . . But the important point to be noted
in all the cases is that secondary as distinguished from primary lia-
89. 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
90. See Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696-97, 98
Cal. Rptr. 702, 703-04 (1971) (cases cited in n.1).
784
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bility rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only, being
based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from
some positive rule of common law or statutory law or because of
a failure to discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous con-
dition caused by the act of the one primarily responsible. 91
Notwithstanding the strong language contained in the McCabe opin-
ion, there is obviously some question as to whether these statements are
viable today as they were made prior to the adoption of a system of
comparative negligence. It should be remembered that the court had
only the options of reducing an extremely blameworthy party's liability
by placing the burden on a party relatively free from fault, or of holding
the blameworthy party solely responsible for the damage. However,
under a system of pure comparative negligence and comparative contri-
bution, most or all of the loss may be ascribed to an extremely blame-
worthy party according to the percentage of his causal negligence as
determined by the trier of fact. It seems that some state supreme courts
have denied claims for indemnification and have held that contribution
is the proper remedy because of this possibility.9 2 The statement of the
California Supreme Court in Li that a system of comparative negligence
should provide for apportionment of damages in all cases9" also appears
to be a recognition that indemnity should be replaced with comparative
contribution. In fact, it has been suggested by one commentator that
the adoption of comparative negligence will cause comparative contribu-
tion to be used in all cases where indemnity had previously been
granted, except where liability is predicated solely on the fault of
another or based on an express indemnity agreement.94
C. Contribution Suits Under Comparative Negligence-Problems of
Impleader Where Plaintiff Sues Only One Potential Joint Tortfeasor
The case may occur where a plaintiff, although injured by the negli-
gent acts of two wrongdoers, sues only one person for his injuries and
thus fails to join the other wrongdoer who could be a party defendant.95
The party defendant, faced with the possibility of litigating the suit
91. 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71.
92. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207
N.W.2d 866 (1973).
93. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873.
94. See SCRWARTZ, supra note 13, § 16.9.
95. Various tactical reasons such as general reluctance on the part of the jury to
impose liability on similarly situated persons, a tortfeasor's possession of a good defense,
or the presence of particular counsel, could cause a plaintiff not to join an otherwise
responsible person. In addition, there may be a problem of obtaining jurisdiction over a
particular person.
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alone and being held solely liable, may often wish to expand the lawsuit
by impleading the absent wrongdoer. Past California cases have found
two obstacles to impleader; first, the California contribution statute, and
second, the California joinder of parties provision as it existed between
1957 and 1971.0 Although a joinder of parties provision was adopted
in 1971 to provide for impleader, 97 the California contribution statute 8
has not been changed, and no right to implead a party for contribution
has been found to exist under the express terms of that statute. 9
Before the 1971 adoption of the impleader device, the right of a party
to bring additional parties into the litigation was uncertain.'00 In 1957,
when the then existing California joinder of parties provision was
amended after a recommendation and study by the California Law
Revision Commission,' 0' there was no intention to provide for third
party practice. 102 Indeed, there was considerable opposition from
members of the bar to the adoption of third party practice without
careful study.0 3 The Law Revision Commission had only considered
addition of new parties in the context of indispensable parties and, in the
terminology of the current statute, "counterclaims" against a plaintiff. 0 4
However, the statute was drafted in ambiguous language, giving rise to
the inference that third party practice was intended.' 0 Consequently,
California courts allowed impleader when a party asserted a claim for
indemnification against a third party;0 6 but in cases where a claim for
96. See Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 550-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-99
(1962); accord, Balding v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 562, 54 Cal. Rptr.
717, 719 (1966).
97. See CAL. CODE Crv. tpoc. §§428.10, 428.20, 428.30; see generally Recommen-
dation And Study Relating To Counterclaims And Cross-Complaints, Joinder Of Causes
Of Action, And Related Provisions, 10 CAL. L. REvIsION COMM'N REPORTS 500 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as COMM'N REPORT 1971].
98. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§875-880.
99. See General Elec. Co. v. California ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d
918, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973); Balding v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559,
54 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1966); Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1962).
100. See Friedenthal, The Expansion of Joinder in Cross-Complaints by the
Erroneous Interpretation of Section 442 of The California Code of Civil Procedure, 51
CAL. L. REv. 494, 498-500 (1963).
101. See Recommendation And Study Relating To Bringing New Parties Into Civil
Actions, 1 CAL. L. REviSION COMM'N REPORTS M-1 (1957).
102. See Friedenthal, The Expansion of Joinder in Cross-Complaints by the Er-
roneous Interpretation of Section 442 of The California Code of Civil Procedure,
51 CAL. L. REv. 494, 496 (1963).
103. See Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints:
Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. RFv. 1, 31 (1970).
104. See Friedenthal, The Expansion of Joinder in Cross-Complaints by the
Erroneous Interpretation of Section 442 of The California Code of Civil Procedure, 51
CAL. L. REv. 494, 495 (1963).
105. See Comment, Bringing New Parties Into Civil Actions in California, 46 CAL.
L. REv. 100, 104-05 (1958).
106. See, e.g., Roylance v. Doegler, 57 Cal. 2d 255, 368 P.2d 535, 19 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1962); J.C. Penney Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 217 Cal. App. 2d 834, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1963); Linday v. American President Lines, Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 2d 146, 29
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contribution was made, no right of impleader was found to exist under
the statute.10 7 The reason for this distinction is unclear, but perhaps the
requirements of the contribution statute were a factor. In addition, the
interjection of an additional party into the lawsuit without the plaintiff's
consent was felt to be an undesirable complication absent clear legisla-
tive authority.'08 Partly because of these uncertainties, impleader was
expressly provided for by statute after a new study and recommendation
by the Law Revision Commission. 0 9 At the present time, therefore, it
is clear that a procedural device does exist to bring in an absent party if
a claim for contribution can be made. However, by the express terms of
the California contribution statute, a defendant who has been found
jointly liable with another defendant for the plaintiff's injuries must have
paid more than his pro rata share of the judgment before a claim for
contribution can be made."0  A fortiori, before the imposition and
payment of a joint judgment, only a contingent claim for contribution
can exist. As noted previously, the California courts have rejected
contingent claims for contribution, not only because of the problems
with impleader, but also because contribution was not recognized at
common law. 1 In summary, the existing California law is anomalous:
impleader is recognized but a contingent claim for contribution is not.
As a result, a defendant cannot implead another person on the basis of a
claim for contribution. Whether comparative negligence will change
this result is undetermined at present.
It should be noted that under a pure comparative negligence system,
the policy of refusing to place all of the loss on a plaintiff simply because
his conduct in some measure contributed to his injury is inconsistent
with the policy of placing all of the loss on a defendant who together
with another person caused injury to the plaintiff, simply because the
plaintiff sued only that defendant. Under certain circumstances, how-
ever, this result can be justified after a consideration of the interests of
the respective parties. The societal interest in providing compensation
for an injured person should not be made contingent on a defendant's
right to minimize his liability by shifting some of the loss to a person
whose conduct was also a substantial factor in causing the injury. If
there is an injustice as between defendants, provision should be made to
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963); Simon Hardware Co. v. Pacific Tire & Rubber Co., 199 Cal. App.
2d 616, 29 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1962).
107. See cases cited note 99 supra.
108. Id.
109. See CAL. CoD CrV. PROC. §§428.10, 428.20, 428.30; COMM'N REPORT 1971,
supra note 97, at 551-53, 610-15.
110. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §875(c).
111. E.g., American Can Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d
520, 523, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 (1962).
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allow the defendants to subsequently allocate the responsibility for the
harm between themselves. On the other hand, this result is not mandat-
ed in all cases. If a defendant is able to locate and serve an absent
wrongdoer without inconvenience, there is no valid reason to prohibit
impleader of that person. Clearly, the artificial requirement of the
California contribution statute pertaining to the need for a joint judg-
ment 21 is not such a reason.
In New York, which had a contribution statute 13 virtually identical
to that of California, the courts interpreted their statute as providing for
impleader. 14  In arriving at this interpretation, the courts utilized a
multi-step analysis which included the following reasoning: first, a
defendant could implead a third party to assert a right of indemnity.
Second, the distinction between contribution and indemnity was a
strained concept and was difficult to apply. Third, both doctrines
evolved before comparative negligence and comparative contribution as
attempts to more fairly allocate loss among tortfeasors. Fourth, if
contribution was dependent on the existence of a joint judgment, the
injured party's willingness or ability to sue more than one wrongdoer
was determinative." 5 Finally, the courts held that the New York contri-
bution statute did not contemplate an apportionment that had already
been made as part of the judgment. As a result of this analysis, these
courts, perhaps artificially or superlegislatively, were able to circumvent
the state contribution statute and provide for impleader.
This result is probably justified in that it creates a fairer system which
also avoids multiplicity of litigation. However, as one New York court
emphasized," 06 a system permitting impleader should not be allowed to
become an obscurant. The principle of joint and several liability should
not be abolished and the plaintiff's right to recover should not be made
conditional on the presence of all potential joint tortfeasors. It is
112. See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§875-880.
113. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§1401, 1402 (McKinney 1963); amended, L. 1974 c. 742, §1
(McKinney 1975-76) (amending §§1401, 1402, adding §§1403, 1404).
114. See, e.g., Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241,
334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); Lipson v. Gerwitz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1972).
115. Prosser was critical of conditioning contribution on the existence of a jointjudgment, as evidenced by the following:
There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the en-
tire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally
responsible, to be shouldered on one alone, according to the accident of a
successful levy of execution, . . . the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his collusion
with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.
PROSSER, supra note 5, §50, at 307. For a similar criticism of the California contribu-
tion statute, see Comment, Joint Tortfeasors: Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding
Releases and Contribution, 9 HAST. L.J. 180, 186-87 (1958).
116. See Lipson v. Gerwitz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 602, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1972).
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therefore urged that California also adopt this approach by appropriate
alteration of the contribution statute, or, if necessary, by judicial inter-
pretation.
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The prior discussion assumed that all interested parties were present
and that all issues in a comparative negligence action were settled in a
single suit. However, subsequent suits between the same or different
parties may be necessary for a variety of reasons. This section will
analyze the effect of the adoption of comparative negligence on these
subsequent actions, focusing particularly on the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel where one or more persons have not participated
in the original suit. In addition, the existing statutory rules of joinder of
parties and causes will be considered.
The following hypothetical is illustrative of the problems to be en-
countered in the discussion to follow. Plaintiffs P1 and P2 suffer
property damage and personal injuries when a car owned and operated
by D, collides with a car owned and operated by D2. P1 brings an
action against D, for his property damages and is found to have suffered
$10,000 in damages and to have been 10 percent at fault. Dt is found
to have suffered no damage and to have been 50 percent at fault. D2,
although not a party to the action, is found to have been 40 percent at
fault. D1 discharges the entire judgment by paying $9000 to Pi. After
final determination of the original suit, the following actions might be
commenced:
1. P1 sues D1, for additional property damage;
2. P1 sues D1, for personal injuries;
3. P2 sues D1 and D2, for injuries and damages sustained as the
result of the collision;
4. D, sues D2, for contribution for the amount paid to P1.
The following discussion focuses on how the courts should resolve these
suits under California law after the introduction of comparative negli-
gence.
A. Rules of Joinder of Parties and Causes
The statutes concerning the joinder of parties and causes are legisla-
tively enacted rules that may serve as limitations on subsequent suits.
The general objective of these rules is to promote an efficient judicial
system which may effectively resolve, in a single action, all disputes
arising out of a particular incident.11 7 In some cases, effective relief
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necessitates the presence of all persons affected by the decision;" 8 thus,
a plaintiff must bring all these persons before the court at the same time
or suffer a dismissal. 119 However, where a claimant suffers an injury as
the result of the combined activities of two or more persons, all responsi-
ble parties need not be joined.120 This rule is predicated upon the
concept of joint and several liability. A wrongdoer whose negligence is
a substantial factor in causing all of a claimant's damages should not be
allowed to object at the expense of the claimant that other persons are
not present as parties to share the liability.
On the other hand, joinder rules compel a defendant to assert all
causes arising out of an incident against the claimant in the same
proceeding.' Thus, if a defendant has any claim for damages arising
out of the same occurrence which is the subject matter of the claimantes
cause of action, he must assert it against the claimant by way of cross-
complaint in that suit.122 It is important to note that a plaintiff is not
compelled to assert all causes that he might possess against a defendant.
The reason for this distinction is not expressed in the statute, but a
proposed provision requiring a plaintiff to assert all his causes of action
against a defendant in a single action was deleted at the request of the
California State Bar Assocation. 23 The State Bar Association believed
that such a provision would unduly complicate the administration of
justice by burdening the courts with a determination of when an addi-
tional cause of action is barred, and infringe upon the plaintiff's right to
defer some actions until possible settlement or to recover under newly
discovered causes of action.'24
It seems that these considerations should remain intact under a com-
parative negligence system. The imposition of a mandatory joinder of
parties and causes provision, although advocated by some, is not re-
117. See Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MIcH. L. REv.
327, 330, 338 (1957); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in Federal
Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 879-881 (1958); Note, Indispensable Parties in the
Federal Courts, 65 HAMv. L. REv. 1050, 1052-1058 (1952).
118. See authorities cited in note 117 supra.
119. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 19; CAL. Code Civ. PRoc. §389.
120. See, e.g., Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 206
F.2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 899 (1953); People ex rel. Dep't
Pub. Works v. Clausen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 770, 786, 57 Cal. Rptr. 227, 239 (1967); see
also J. MooRE, 3A FEDERAL PRAcTcE 19.11 at 2364-66 (2d ed. 1974).
121. See Brenner v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 494 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.
1974); Rothrock v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 616, 43 Cal. Rptr. 716(1965); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 343 P.2d 977 (1959).
122. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 13(a); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §426.30.
123. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR AssOCIATIOcN, COMMrrrEE ON ADMiNISTRATION Or
JUsTCE AND ADvisons (1970-71), Minutes of General Meeting of June 18-19, 1971 at
7-8; CALIFORNIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMITITEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIca
ANm ADVISORS (1970-71), Statement on S.B. 201 at 2-7 (March 22, 1971).
124. See authorities cited in note 123 supra.
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quired for the system to function properly. 25  Therefore, a plaintiff
should not be compelled to join all his causes of action against a
defendant in one law suit or to join all potential tortfeasors.
B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may significantly
affect subsequent suits. These doctrines evidence a public policy de-
signed to promote efficiency in the judicial system and insure uniformity
in decisions. 26 Further objectives inherent in the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are:
1. to decrease the volume of litigation;
2. to protect persons from the harassment of having to repeat-
edly relitigate the same cause of action against the same adversary;
3. to diminish the expense of litigation by avoiding repeated
and/or protracted litigation;
4. to hasten resolution of disputes; and
5. to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.1 27
The term res judicata as used in this comment refers to that doctrine
in its pure sense, which incorporates the principles of merger and bar as
they apply to plaintiffs and defendants. Merger applies to the plaintiff
who has won a judgment: his cause of action is merged into the
125. Some commentators have advocated mandatory joinder of parties under a
system of comparative negligence. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH.
L. REV. 465, 503-04 (1953); SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at §17.1. However, it is this
writer's conclusion that it should not be required. Notwithstanding "long-arm statutes"
granting jurisdiction over a tortfeasor, mandatory joinder of parties would make a
plaintiff's recovery contingent upon his locating and obtaining service of process on all
persons whose activities contributed to his injury. If a plaintiff failed to do so, his suit
would be dismissed. A consideration of the interests of the parties reveals that this is
not justified. See text following note 40 supra. The societal interest in providing full
compensation to an injured party outweighs the interest of a defendant, whose conduct
was a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury to the plaintiff, in being able to
escape a duty to compensate an injured plaintiff merely because another person's
negligence was also a contributing cause of the injury. If there is an injustice in
providing full compensation to an injured party at the expense of one of a number of
responsible tortfeasors then that injustice should be corrected, but not by the Procrustean
remedy of conditioning recovery on the presence of all responsible persons.
Two methods can be seen to eliminate this potential injustice without compulsoryjoinder of all tortfeasors. First, a defendant present before the court should be allowed
to assert a cause of action for contribution by impleader. Any other person alleged to be
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries or damages thus may be brought into court to share
the responsibility. Second, subsequent suits for contribution should be allowed without
the artificial requirement of a joint judgment as the right to such relief should be
conditioned upon conduct which jointly, successively, or concurrently causes injury to the
plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 72-88 supra.
126. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rnv. 818, 820-30(1952). 
- fet fPirLtgto ,3127. Id. See generally Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Eff cts of Prior Litigation, 39
IowA L. Rv. 217 (1954); Wright, Estoppel By Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim
Under Modern Pleading, 39 IowA L. REV. 255 (1954).
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judgment and is thereby extinguished.1 28  Bar is applicable where the
defendant has won; the plaintiff is barred from asserting the same cause
of action again.12 9 Thus, res judicata operates to reduce litigation
between the same parties on the same cause of action by precluding
further litigation on any matter raised in that cause of action after a
court of competent jurisdiction has made a final decision on the mer-
its.13 In addition, even though a particular matter may not have been
raised in a prior suit, under res judicata the parties are precluded from
relitigating any issue entailed in the same cause of action.' 3' On the
other hand, collateral estoppel operates as a bar to further litigation of
issues actually litigated and determined by making the prior finding
conclusive in subsequent suits, even though the parties may not be
identical. 32
As originally formulated, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel bound only the parties to the original suit under the so-called
"mutuality of estoppel" rule. 33  This rule required that a party assert-
ing an estoppel must also be subject to an assertion of the same estoppel
by the opposing party. 3 4 As a result, in most cases, only the original
parties were bound by the original judgment. However, in Bernhard v.
Bank of America National Trust,"5 the California Supreme Court
discarded this rule by holding that one need not have been a party to the
original suit in order to assert the prior resolution of an issue against a
person who did participate in the former adjudication.136 The basis for
the courts ruling was the principle that once a party has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate an issue, there is no sound reason for allowing
that party to relitigate the matter. 3 Hence, assuming identity of issue,
a prior adverse ruling on an issue would be conclusive in a subsequent
suit and a party would not stand to benefit by a second suit against a
different person or by a related cause of action against the same party.
Thus, this new rule, coupled with the time and expense of additional
litigation, is a strong influence on a party to assert all causes in a single
suit.
In Bernhard, the supreme court determined that the doctrine of
128. F. JA Es, Civi PRGOCEDUE §11.9 at 550 (1965).
129. Id.
130. See Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 1457, 1457-58 (1968).
131. See Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal. 2d 874, 880, 299 P.2d 865, 868 (1956).
132. Id.
133. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. RaV. 281, 283-84 (1957).
134. See id.
135. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1941).
136. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
137. Id.
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collateral estoppel could be asserted in subsequent litigation if: (1) the
issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented
for resolution in the case at bar; (2) -there is a final decision on the
merits; and (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted is a party or
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; that is, the party has
had a day in court to litigate the issue. 138  Thus, the pleadings, record,
and specific findings, if any, of the prior action must be carefully
scrutinized to determine if identity of issue is present. The former
resolution of the issue must also be clearly apparent, or actually and
necessarily included in the prior resolution to be binding in a subsequent
suit.1
39
The abolition of the mutuality of estoppel rule has led the courts to
consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in Bernhard, whether the
former judgment is asserted offensively or defensively. Offensive use of
a judgment occurs when a person, ordinarily the plaintiff in the second
action, relies on the former judgment to conclusively establish in his
favor a necessary element of his cause of action or claim. 40 Defensive
use of a judgment occurs when a stranger to the former judgment,
ordinarily the defendant in the second action, relies on it as conclusively
establishing in his favor an issue he must prove in his defense.' 4'
The offensive or affirmative use of a prior judgment has been criti-
cized on many grounds; however, the usual criticism is that its allowance
favors plaintiffs too heavily. 42  If offensive use is allowed, the argu-
ment runs, prospective plaintiffs will be influenced to refrain from
joining in a suit in the expectation that a decision may be rendered in
favor of similarly situated parties. Thus, if the decision is in favor of a
party with whom the person could have joined, the person who refrained
from joining in the prior suit may assert the judgment against the
defendant in a subsequent action pursuant to the general principles of
collateral estoppel. 43 On the other hand, if the decision is against the
party with whom the person could have joined, it would not be binding
upon him under the due process notions inherent in collateral estoppel
since the latter did not participate in the prior action. 44
138. Id.
139. See Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Anderson, 9 Cal. App. 3d 224, 233, 87 Cal. Rptr.
893, 898, (1970); accord Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 896, 306 P.2d 797, 799
(1957).
140. Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Iowa 1971).
141. Id.
142. Cf. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 27
(1965); Editorial Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral
Estoppel By a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1033 (1967).
143. See authorities cited note 142 supra.
144. See authorities cited note 142 supra.
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This fear of the "wait and see" strategy is untenable for several
reasons. First, a person must wait for the first action to become final
before he can assert any estoppel against the defendant in a subsequent
case. It would appear that few people could afford to wait until the first
judgment was finalized.:4 Second, the possibility that the statute of
limitations might bar a subsequent action may impose a significant risk
in delaying an action until the final resolution of the prior action. Hence,
in order to prevent a claim from being barred by the statute, a plaintiff
will have to file a complaint nonetheless and hope that the defendant
will not move to consolidate the trials. 46 Finally, the suggestion has
been made in the Restatement of Judgments 47 and by a number of
courts 48 that collateral estoppel should not be applied in a manner
inconsistent with public policy. For example, some courts have consid-
ered such factors as the ability of counsel, 149 the amount of the prior
award in relation to the amount demanded in the subsequent suit,1 0 and
the length of the prior trial,' 51 in determining whether offensive use of a
judgment will be allowed. Thus, the discretion of the court is a sound
check on the possibility of abusing this doctrine. Presently, in California
there is a conflict among the appellate courts concerning the offensive
use of a judgment. 152  However, it appears that the modem trend of
145. See JUDICIAL COUNCnIL OF CALIF RNIA, 1975 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE
Gov-RNoR AND LEcisr.TRE 99-101 (1975). The report states that the median time from
the filing of a complaint to trial ranges from four to five months in Santa Barbara, Santa
Clara and Stanislaus Counties to 41.5 months in San Jose. Id. The difference is
attributable to the fact that in some counties a filed complaint is treated as a certificate
of readiness. Should the decision be appealed, the median time for an appeal ranges
from 13 to 26 months. Id. at 81. Furthermore, California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1049 states that an unsatisfied action is pending until its final determination on
appeal or until the time for appeal has passed. California Rules of Court 2 and 16(a)
give 180 days in which to file a notice of appeal and 30 more days to file a record of the
decision below. California cases have held that a judgment must be final before it can
be asserted. E.g., Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 974, 500
P.2d 1386, 1392, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1972). It is clear, therefore, that it would take
at least two years before a final decision can be rendered in California.
146. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1048, granting the court, at its discretion, the
power to consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact; Jackson v.
Lactein Co., 209 Cal. 520, 288 P. 781 (1930) (holding that the trial court in its
discretion may consolidate actions).
147. REsrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, §70f (1942).
148. E.g., Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 870, 86 Cal. Rptr.
359, 365 (1971); Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 185, 24 Cal. Rptr.
515, 522 (1962).
149. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1052-54 (1970).
150. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2nd
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
151. See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-729 (D.C.
Nev. 1962), al'd sub nom., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 404-05 (9th
Cir. 1964).
152. Compare Vanguard Recording Soc'y, Inc. v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 410, 100 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972) and Louie Quierlo Trucking, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 194, 60 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1967) (allowing offensive use) with
Lea v. Shank, 5 Cal. App. 3d 964, 85 Cal. Rptr. 709, 86 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1969);
McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d 422, 28 Cal. Rptr. 37
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authority is to allow such use.153 Before moving to a discussion of the
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel in a comparative
negligence system, however, the California definition of a cause of
action must be considered. Notwithstanding the language of some early
and seemingly conflicting California cases, 54 a cause of action is deter-
mined by an examination of the primary rights infringed by the defend-
ant during a single tortious event or related series of events.' 55 Thus,
where a defendant is involved in an automobile collision which causes
injury to both the automobile and the person of a plaintiff, two separate
causes of action are created. First, since plaintiff's interest in the quiet
enjoyment of his property was infringed when defendant damaged
plaintiff's car, a cause of action is created for that injury. 156 Second,
since plaintiff's interest in freedom from impermissible interference with
the integrity of his person was infringed when he sustained personal
injuries, a second cause of action is also created. 57 This theory has been
criticized on the basis that there is a potential for increased litigation
through the creation of two separate causes of action.158  However, the
cost of additional litigation and the possibility that a court may find a
(1963); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958) (disallowing
offensive use).
153. The increasing number of cases that allow offensive use is one indication of
this trend. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (D.C. Nev.
1962), affd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 404-05 (9th Cir.
1964); Skrzat v. Ford Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 753 (D.R.I. 1975); Cover v. Platte
Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956); Continental Can
Co. v. Hudson Foam Latex Prod., Inc., 129 N.J. Super. 426, 324 A.2d 60 (1974);
Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,
19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Bahler v. Fletcher, 275 Or.
1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970). In addition, one of the early commentator's criticism of the
allowance of offensive use has been withdrawn. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25 (1965).
In comparative negligence actions it makes little sense to prohibit offensive use. It
should be noted that if a prior decision fixes a high proportionate share of fault on a
plaintiff, a defendant will wish to assert the judgment against the plaintiff. The nature
of this type of assertion fixing plaintiff's recovery, although defensive, is not significantly
different than the plaintiff's assertion of a judgment which had fixed a high responsibility
for the accident on the defendant. Prohibition of offensive use would unduly favor
defendants. For example, a defendant who has been found to be 75 percent at fault will
not wish to assert the judgment, while a defendant who has been found 25 percent at
fault will wish to rely on the judgment. Thus, if offensive use is prohibited, the only
times a judgment will be used are cases where a prior finding has fixed a large portion of
the responsibility on a plaintiff. Therefore, in comparative negligence actions there
should be no absolute prohibition of offensive use; the court in its discretion should
determine the applicability of a former judgment.
154. E.g., Dobbins Title Guar. & Trust Co., 22 Cal. 2d 64, 136 P.2d 572 (1943);
Phelan v. Quinn, 130 Cal. 374, 62 P. 623 (1900); Woolverton v. Baker, 98 Cal. 628, 33
P. 731 (1893); Morrison v. Wilhoit, 62 Cal. App. 2d 830, 145 P.2d 707 (1944).
155. Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431 (1969); see also Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Com-
plaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1970).
156. See Holmes v. David H. Bricker, 70 Cal. 2d 786, 452 P.2d 647, 76 Cal. Rptr.
431 (1969).
157. See id.
158. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggest-
ed Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 13 (1970).
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subsequent suit subsumed by a previously asserted cause of action
appear to provide a check on this danger.
C. Application in Multiple Party Litigation
The paucity of applicable case law necessitates the creation of specific
hypothetical situations to illustrate the application of the aforementioned
concepts. Unless otherwise indicated, these hypotheticals are those of
the writer.
1. Party Plaintiff Against a Defendant Party to Prior Proceedings
This hypothetical assumes that Plaintiff, P, sustains property damage
as the result of a collision between two automobiles owned and operated
by D1 and D2. P, believing D1 is more able to discharge any award,
brings suit only against D1 in accordance with the principle of joint and
several liability of concurrent tortfeasors, for negligently inflicted prop-
erty damage. P is found to have been 10 percent at fault and to have
suffered $1000 in damage. D1 discharges the judgment of $900.
Within the period of limitation, P subsequently discovers personal inju-
ries and additional property damage and again sues D, alone.
The existing case law in California holds that a plaintiff who has been
found contributorily negligent in one action is barred from suing again
for any related damages on the basis of collateral estoppel159 Contri-
butory negligence thus operates as a complete bar to any recovery for
negligently inflicted personal injury or property damage because, even
though a subsequent suit may present a different cause of action than
the first suit, contributory negligence will still be an issue. However,
this rule should no longer apply under a system of comparative negli-
gence. Unlike the former rule concerning contributory negligence, the
new system allows a plaintiff to recover all damages not occasioned by
his negligence. Therefore, a plaintiff will not be totally barred from
asserting a different cause of action to recover all damages not occa-
sioned by his negligence.
When P sues D, for additional property damage, however, the action
will be barred under the doctrine of res judicata, since the second suit is
based on the same cause of action presented in the prior suit against the
same party. The fact that the claim for the additional damage has not
159. See Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-96, 28 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1934);
Manning v. Wymer, 273 Cal. App. 2d 519, 526, 78 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1969) (dictum);
Artucovich v. Arizmendiz, 256 Cal. App. 2d 130, 135, 63 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (1967).
See generally Comment, Res Judicata: Prior Adjudication of Negligence Bars Relitiga-
tion Of That Issue By Defendant To Former Action, 1966 DuK' L.I. 283 (1966).
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yet been determined is irrelevant as res judicata affects all claims arising
from a cause of action which might have been litigated as well as those
which were actually litigated. 16° On the other hand, P's claim for
personal injuries sustained as a result of the collision is an assertion of a
different cause of action than that of the first suit. This result obtains
because the "primary rights" theory grants a cause of action for injury to
one's person and another cause of action for injury to one's property.
Thus, the doctrine of res judicata would be inapplicable to bar the
claim.
Collateral estoppel might apply however, if the Bernhard elements are
present.' 6 ' The first action was for negligently inflicted property dam-
age and the second action was for negligently inflicted personal injury
arising out of the same incident; therefore, the same issue of Di's
negligent conduct is presented. The discharge of the judgment by
payment thereof ensures the finality of the decision. Di, as a party to
the first action, clearly satisfies the privity requirement. Therefore, the
Bernhard elements are present and collateral estoppel would be applica-
ble. Since P would wish to assert the former judgment to establish the
liability of D1, this would be an offensive use of collateral estoppel.
Assuming offensive use would be allowed by the court, D1 will be
responsible for 90 percent of the fault in inflicting P's personal injuries
in accordance with the finding in the first suit.
It should be noted that if in the second suit D, attempts to recover
damages sustained in the accident, the compulsory cross-complaint rule
will bar his claim.' 62  The defendant must assert any claim arising
out of the accident by way of counterclaim against the claimant or be
barred from any subsequent recovery.
2. New Plaintiff Against Party Defendants
In the next situation, P2, not a party to the prior action, sues D1 and
D2, who were parties to the prior suit brought by Pi. The hypothet-
ical assumes that P, and P2 are passengers in a car driven by D1. Di's
car collides with an automobile owned and operated by D2. Suit 1 is
brought by P1, who is found to have been 10 percent at fault; Defend-
ants D1 and D2 are found to be 70 percent and 20 percent at fault,
respectively. The judgment is paid to P1. Suit 2 is then brought by P2
against D1 and D2.
To avoid litigating the issues of the defendants' liability and propor-
160. See authorities cited note 159 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
162. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 13(a); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §426.30.
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tionate causation, P2 might wish to assert the Suit 1 judgment offensive-
ly in Suit 2 against D, and D2 . Since the parties against whom the plea
is sought to be asserted were parties to the prior suit, and since the
judgment was made final by payment, two of the elements of the
Bernhard test are present. The major problem posed is whether the
issues presented for adjudication in the second suit are identical with
those in the first. Additionally, there is the ancillary consideration as to
whether offensive use of the judgment will be permitted.
If it is undisputed that both passengers were only nominally negli-
gent, perhaps for failure to keep a lookout, there appears no sound
reason why the former resolution of the issues concerning their negli-
gence should be relitigated. Indeed, under almost identical facts, a
federal court in Gorski v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, New
Jersey'63 held a prior decision to be conclusive, and thus the drivers in
that case were collaterally estopped to dispute a prior finding of negli-
gence.164 However, if there is extreme disparity in the amount of the
two claims, public policy would probably dictate against making the
prior judgment conclusive.' 65 For example, the motivation to vigorous-
ly defend the first suit may not have been present on the part of D, and
D2 if the amount of Pi's claim was relatively small.
Significantly different considerations arise if the facts of the hypothet-
ical are altered so that D. and D2 allege in the second suit that P2 was
negligent because of interference with the driver. This factual setting
would be distinguishable from that of Gorski, where the court noted that
there was no allegation of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 66 The
allegation of negligence should preclude the total binding effect of the
former judgment because the prior decision fixed virtually all of the
responsibility for the accident on the defendants. 67 If P2's negligence
is to be taken into account, then a new finding must be made as to the
proportionate responsibility of the parties. On the other hand, the prior
finding that the defendants were negligent to some degree should not be
disturbed if the defendants had a full and fair opportunity to disprove
Pi's allegation of negligence.'6 "
Under the above circumstances the court faces two alternatives: it
may allow only the negligence of the plaintiff to be determined, with the
defendants then being liable for the plaintiff's recoverable damages in
163. 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
164. Id. at 13.
165. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2nd
Cir. 1965), cekt. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
166. 206 F. Supp. at 12-13.
167. Id.
168. See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
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the relative proportion fixed in the former decision;169 or it may allow
the defendants to relitigate the issue of their negligence. In selecting an
alternative, the court should consider the amount of time to be saved by
litigating only the issue of plaintiff's negligence. If it appears that
virtually the same witnesses would be presented and that the same
factual disputes must be resolved to determine the plaintiff's negligence
as would be required to determine the proportionate responsibility of the
defendants, the defendants should be allowed to relitigate the quantum
of their negligence. The court might also consider the possibility that
one defendant might be unable to pay, which would focus the responsi-
bility for the accident on the other defendant. If this appears to be the
case, there would be nothing to be gained by allowing the defendants to
relitigate their proportionate share of liability and therefore the court
should allow only the negligence of the plaintiff to be determined in the
second suit.
In any event, the court should be wary of the possibility that a
defendant, previously found to be largely responsible for an accident,
may use a bare allegation of plaintiff's negligence as a means to reliti-
gate and hopefully reduce the amount of his proportionate share. In
resolving this issue the court should carefully examine the pleadings,
record, and special findings of the prior action to determine whether the
same issue was presented therein. If it had been tried and determined,
then there is no triable issue in the second action under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Of course, if there is a new ground presented for
the plaintiff's possible negligence, the court should allow the parties to
relitigate the issue. In summary, a court should weigh a number of
different considerations in arriving at its decision of whether to allow the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to be invoked.
3. Absent Person Made a Party Defendant in a Subsequent Pro-
ceeding
In contrast with the above hypotheticals, the situation may arise
where a wrongdoer was not a defendant in the prior suit. Subsequently,
a second action might be brought and the absent person made a party
defendant. The following hypothetical situation assumes that Plaintiff,
P, sues D1 for property damage sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles owned and operated by D1 and D2. D2 cannot be
located, and therefore P brings an action against D., alone. The trier of
fact determines that P was 10 percent at fault, that D1 was 60 percent at
169. Since P was 10 percent at fault, 10 percent of his $10,000 damages would be
deducted ($1000), leaving a total award of $9000.
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fault, and that D2 was 30 percent at fault. Dt pays the entire award
under the principle of joint and several liability. Subsequently, P sues
D, for his personal injuries, and, now able to locate D2, joins him as a
party defendant.
Any of the parties present in the second action could conceivably
raise the claim that collateral estoppel precludes the litigation of certain
issues. P could argue that Di is estopped to relitigate his proportionate
liability; D, or D2 could argue that P is precluded from relitigating his
own negligence; and D2 could argue that P and D1 are estopped to
relitigate their negligence. Irrespective of any finding in the first suit
purportedly establishing D2's negligence or proportionate liability, it is
elementary that due process prevents D2 from being bound by that prior
determination since he was not a party. 7 0 Therefore, D2 must be allowed
to litigate the issues of his negligence and proportionate causation, if
any. The problem thus becomes the extent to which the prior decision
will bind P and D1.
The courts should not permit relitigation of the issue of whether P
and D.1 were negligent, as both were parties to the prior action and had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the first action. How-
ever, if their proportionate liability is found to be conclusive in the
subsequent suit, D2s liability is fixed as well as the remaining percent-
age. Perhaps the question of the conclusiveness of P and Di's propor-
tionate liability should depend upon whether D2 is found to have been
negligent by the trier of fact in the second suit. If it is found that D2
was not negligent, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be
applied to preclude P and D, from relitigating the proportionate share of
their combined negligence because the most accurate determination of
all persons' responsibilities is made in the subsequent proceeding where
all persons were present as parties. Furthermore, D1 should not be
allowed to object on the grounds of inconsistency with the first suit.
Under the principle of joint and several liability, Di was liable for the
entire award in the first action; the end result of the second action is the
same: he is liable for the entire award as the sole tortfeasor. Thus, no
injustice results from the application of collateral estoppel in this situa-
tion.
On the other hand, if D2 is found negligent in the second suit, the
courts have a number of alternatives in determining the effect of the first
action. If the tortfeasor absent from the first action, D2, is willing to
waive his due process objections, the court could treat the first action as
170. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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establishing the negligence of P1 and the combined negligence of the
defendants. The actual proportionate liability of each defendant would
then be relitigated in the second action. A defendant, absent from the
first action, would generally desire this application of collateral estoppel
in situations where the prior determination ascribed a high proportion of
liability to the plaintiff. Similarly, in cases where the prior decision
affixed most of the responsibility on the plaintiff and the sole defendant,
the absent person might also be willing to allow the first adjudication to
have preclusive effect in the second action.
Of course, the absent person would not be willing to waive his due
process objections under certain circumstances. For example, in cases
where he believes that more liability may be attributed to the plaintiff in
the second action, he may argue that the first finding should not be
made conclusive. By the same token, if the prior finding assigned a
large portion of the liability to him, the absent person will attempt to
prevent the former action from having preclusive effect. Thus, in cases
involving a defendant absent from the first proceeding, that person will
argue for the application of collateral estoppel only where it would be to
his benefit in the second action. Thus, an apparent inconsistency is
created by an absent person's privilege to argue for or against the
imposition of collateral estoppel: in some cases a decision will be given
preclusive effect while in other cases preclusive effect will be denied.
The rationale for permitting this inconsistency can be found in the
due process notions inherent in the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 171
The absent person's constitutional protection against being bound by a
decision in which he was not a participant is certainly important enough
to justify the inconsistency. Additionally, in some instances the most
efficient use of the judicial system will be achieved by allowing a prior
action to have preclusive effect rather than creating an absolute prohibi-
tion on its use. One method which the courts could use to eliminate
some potential problems would be to require a finding in the first suit
only as to the combined negligence of the defendants and not a specific
determination as to the negligence of each defendant severally. The
plaintiff could not object to this procedure because he had the oppor-
tunity to fully litigate the issue of his negligence in the first action.
Similarly, the defendants could not object because they will be allowed
to litigate the issue of their proportionate liability. If this procedure is
applied to the above hypothetical case, the trier of fact in the second suit
must accept the prior finding that P was 10 percent at fault and the
two defendants 90 percent at fault. Thus, it will be determined in the
171. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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subsequent suit how the 90 percent will be apportioned between Di
and D2.
4. Subsequent Actions for Additional Compensation Against a Per-
son Absent From the Prior Proceeding
Thus far, the assessment of proportionate liability and the ramifica-
tions of that process have been considered. The discussion now turns to
a consideration of the manner in which a plaintiff who has recovered
part of his damages may collect any remaining or additional damages
from other persons. The following hypothetical assumes that P is found
to have been 30 percent at fault and to have suffered $10,000 in
damages in the first suit. D1, a party defendant in that proceeding, is
found to have been 40 percent at fault; D2, absent from the action, is
found to have been 30 percent at fault. D., under the principle of joint
and several liability, pays the entire judgment of $7000, the amount
remaining after the percentage of damages attributable to the plaintiff's
negligence is deducted. P now attempts to obtain the remaining 30
percent of his damages ($3000) from 12.
Once a plaintiff receives the full sum remaining after his damages are
reduced proportionately by the amount of his own negligence, a claim
for additional compensation on the same cause of action from a tortfea-
sor absent from the prior proceeding should be denied. If the claim is
on the same cause of action, that is, if it involves infringement of the
same primary right, it can be rejected on several grounds. First, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes any assertion of a claim incon-
sistent with the claim in the former proceeding since the issues of
negligence and proportionate liability are identical with those presented
in the former action. D2, although not a party to the former action,
may assert the judgment against the plaintiff defensively since the latter
was a party to the prior proceeding and had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the matter. Consequently, the plaintiff will be estopped to
claim a different amount of damages or to dispute the prior finding of
his negligence. Second, due to the -general rule that a plaintiff is
entitled to but one compensation for a single injury,1 2 any payment
over the amount of the first judgment constitutes a double recovery.
Third, the goal of a comparative negligence system is to allow a plaintiff
172. See Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 638, 134 P.2d 242, 244
(1943); Beronio v. Southern Pac. R.R., 86 Cal. 415, 421, 24 P. 1093, 1094 (1890).
However, the damages awarded can include future loss of earnings and pain and
suffering reasonably certain to occur. Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11
Cal. 2d 576, 588, 81 P.2d 894, 900 (1938); Bonneau v. North Shore R.R., 152 Cal, 406,
414, 93 P. 106, 110 (1907).
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to recover for damages not attributable to his own negligence. 173 Al-
lowing him to recover damages attributable solely to his negligence
would free a plaintiff from any responsibility for his conduct. This result
could not have obtained under the old contributory negligence sys-
tem, 174 and it should not obtain under comparative negligence.
The hypothetical situation may arise, however, where a plaintiff does
not obtain full satisfaction of his award due to the default of the
judgment debtor.175  In a subsequent suit against a joint tortfeasor
absent from the prior proceeding, the former judgment can have no
binding effect on the absent person because of due process considera-
tions. Thus, the plaintiff would have to prove liability on the part of
that defendant in order to be entitled to damages. Of course, if the
former decision placed a large responsibility on the plaintiff for his
injuries, the absent person might wish to take advantage of the judgment
defensively by waiving his due process objections. The elements of
collateral estoppel would definitely be present to allow such use: the
identical issue of plaintiff's negligence was determined in the prior
proceeding; a final decision was rendered on the merits; and the plaintiff
was a party to the prior action.178  The fact that the liability of the
absent defendant is indirectly determined because it is the percentage of
negligence remaining after the percentage attributable to the plaintiff is
deducted should not affect the application of collateral estoppel. There-
fore, that doctrine could be applied should the defendant assert it.
5. Summary
The previous hypotheticals have illustrated the effect of prior actions
on subsequent suits involving the same or different parties. Because res
judicata precludes the same cause of action from being relitigated after a
final decision on the merits, a plaintiff cannot sue for additional damage
once a case has been finally determined. Similarly, if a different cause
of action is asserted, the prior resolution of the issue will be conclusive
on the parties participating in the prior decision under the doctrine
collateral estoppel.
A plaintiff not participating in a former action will be allowed to
assert that judgment against the parties who did participate assuming
173. See text following note 39 supra.
174. See PRossER, supra note 5, §65 at 425, §67 at 433.
175. This hypothetical assumes that execution on the judgment is an unavailable
remedy. In addition, if the judgment is only partially satisfied, the defendant may plead
this amount to reduce his liability. See Savage v. Emery, 255 Cal. App. 2d 603, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 566 (1967); Black v. Bringhurst, 7 Cal. App. 2d 711, 46 P.2d 993 (1935).
176. See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7
the issues are the same. However, a colorable allegation by a defendant
that the new plaintiff was negligent which was not litigated in the
original proceeding presents a different issue. The court, after examin-
ing the evidence to be presented and the potential time consumed,
should usually allow the plaintiff's negligence to be relitigated and fix
the defendants' proportionate liability in the same ratio as the former
suit. Where a person absent from a prior proceeding has been joined as
a defendant in a subsequent suit, the court should allow the defendants
to relitigate their proportionate negligence. However, they should be
bound by the amount of negligence ascribed to the plaintiff in the first
action; which in turn binds them to the finding as to their combined
negligence.
D. Subsequent Actions Between Tort!easors
1. Suits for Contribution 7
The California contribution statute, as presently phrased, does not
permit a subsequent suit for contribution unless a joint judgment has
been entered against both parties. 8 The adoption of a system of
comparative negligence raises the question of whether a joint judgment
should still be required in cases where absent persons can subsequently
be proved to have been joint, concurrent, or successive tortfeasors.
Numerous commentators have found the joint judgment requirement
unfair and illogical.Y The following discussion pertains to the ramifi-
cations of an amendment deleting that requirement from the contribu-
tion statute.
Initially, it should be remembered that any finding purporting to affix
the liability of an absent tortfeasor is not binding on that person unless
his due process objections are waived.'1 0 If comparative contribution is
followed and specific findings were made in the prior action as to the
proportionate liability of each concurrent tortfeasor, however, the absent
tortfeasor may wish to assert the judgment in a contribution suit against
177. The various comparative negligence jurisdictions have taken different ap-
proaches to contribution. Some of these jurisdictions resolve the issue directly in the
primary suit brought by a plaintiff. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §604.01(1) (1976);
N.Y.C.P.L.R. §1401-1404 (McKinney 1975-76); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 2212a
§2(b) (1975). Other jurisdictions permit contribution to be treated in a separate suit
brought by a defendant who has discharged more than his proportionate share of a
judgment. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §6-803 (1975); N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§1401-1404 (McKin-
ney 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-39 (1975).
178. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§875-880.
179. See, e.g., PRossun, supra note 5, §50 at 307; Comment, Joint Tortfeasors:
Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding Releases and Contribution, 9 HAsT. L.J. 180,
186-87 (1958).
180. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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the tortfeasor who was a party to the prior action. If contribution is
made in the same ratio as the finding of negligence, assertion of the
party tortfeasor's liability will fix the liability of the absent tortfeasor as
the remaining portion. Thus, in those cases where the absent tortfeasor
was adjudged to have been minimally at fault, he will probably seek to
make the finding conclusive in the subsequent suit for contribution
brought by the defendant in the first action.
Some decisions rendered before the adoption of comparative negli-
gence have held that a prior finding of negligence on the part of joint
tortfeasors does not affect a later suit for contribution. 81 The rationale
of these cases is that the liability of the defendants inter se was not
litigated in the first case wherein the joint judgment was rendered.182
Thus, in the contribution suit, the tortfeasors are free to litigate their
relative liability on the judgment because the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not apply. The rule of these cases should be inapplicable
under a comparative negligence system. Unlike the situations posed in
the pre-comparative negligence cases, the proportionate liability of the
parties would have been at issue in the first suit if specific findings were
made as to the liability of each party. Therefore, if all parties to the
contribution suit participated in the first case, the prior determination of
their relative negligence should be made conclusive under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.
2. Suit For Damages Between Codefendants
A similar situation is presented where one defendant sues a former
codefendant for damages in a subsequent suit. Assume that P sustains
property damage as the result of a collision between automobiles owned
and operated by D. and D2. In the first suit, P receives a judgment
against D, and D2 on the basis of their negligence. Subsequently, D,
sues D2 in a second suit for personal injuries he sustained in the collision.
Past California cases have held that collateral estoppel is not applica-
ble in the second suit because Di's suit for damages against D2 does not
present the same issues as the previous suit brought by P.181 These
cases proceed on the rationale that the first suit determined only the
liability of D, and D2 with respect to P, and not the relative liability of
181. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. Co. v. Torres, 193 Cal. App. 2d 483, 14 Cal. Rptr.
408 (1961); Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 Conn.
536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947).
182. See cases cited note 181 supra.
183. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, 193 Cal. App. 2d 483, 494-95, 14 Cal. Rptr. 408,
414-15 (1961); Quinn v. Litten, 148 Cal. App. 2d 631, 633-35, 307 P.2d 90, 92-93
(1957); Hardy v. Rosenthal, 2 Cal. App. 2d 442, 445-46, 38 P.2d 412, 413-14 (1934).
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D1 and D2 inter se.'8 4 However, it must be remembered that these cases
were decided under a non-comparative negligence system. Thus, the
courts were faced with the possibility that Di's claim would be barred by
his contributory negligence if the prior finding of his negligent conduct
as to P were given conclusive effect.
These considerations arguably change, however, in comparative negli-
gence cases, wherein specific findings are made as to the relative liability
of the parties. Assuming that comparative contribution is followed, it
would benefit either defendant in the first action to secure a finding of a
low percentage of respective negligence. Therefore, these parties will
generally actively litigate the issue of their relative liability in that action.
As a result, it would appear that the basic elements of collateral estoppel
as espoused in Bernhard are present. 18 Hence, the prior finding of the
relative negligence of D, and D2 should be conclusive in the suit for
damages.
3. Suit for Indemnity
A defendant in a previous suit may be able to institute a subsequent
suit for indemnification against another person in certain cases. This
type of action may be brought either against a former co-defendant or
against a person not a party to the first suit. If, as suggested previous-
ly,'8I comparative contribution will replace indemnity in all situations
except where express indemnity is involved or where the right of in-
demnity is predicated solely on the fault of another, the usual suit for
indemnification will be no different from a suit for contribution. Con-
sequently, if both parties in the indemnity action were parties to the
former action and thus litigated their proportionate liability, the prior
finding should be made conclusive under the Bernhard test. 81 7 How-
ever, if either party to the indemnity action was not a party to the former
action, the prior finding can bind that absent person only if he waives
his due process objections.
On the other hand, if comparative contribution does not replace
indemnity, the traditional law of that doctrine should control. Thus, a
defendant who was found negligent in the first action will be collaterally
estopped from trying to prove that he was not negligent in his subse-
quent suit for indemnification. 88 However, he will ordinarily not be
184. See cases cited note 183 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 94 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 135-139 supra.
188. Conley & Sayre, Indemnity Revisited: Insurance of the Shifting Risk, 22 HAsT.
L.J. 1201, 1227 (1971).
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precluded from litigating the quality of his negligence in an attempt to
prove that he was only passively negligent.1 8 9
E. Effect of Settlements in Multiple Party Actions
Some interesting issues are presented when the possible impact of
comparative negligence upon settlements is considered. It has been
provided by statute that the release of one jointly liable tortfeasor is not
a release of other tortfeasors. 190 Thus, under the principle of joint and
several liability, a plaintiff retains a cause of action for uncompensated
damage against nonsettling tortfeasors. However, a plaintiff's recovery
against these parties must be diminished by the amount of the settlement
on the ground that a plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction.''
Therefore, if a settlement is not accompanied by a dismissal with
prejudice, its effect on a plaintiff should be unchanged by the adoption
of comparative negligence.
Different problems are presented where a settlement is coupled with a
dismissal with prejudice. Pursuant to California law formulated before
the Li decision, a plaintiff's acceptance of a settlement and dismissal
with prejudice is treated as an admission of his contributory negli-
gence.' 92 As a result, some California decisions have given this admis-
sion collateral estoppel effect in the plaintiffs later suit against the
nonsettling tortfeasors, thereby barring his recovery.' 93 This rule is
unsound and should not be continued under the comparative negligence
system. As noted throughout this comment, the purpose of a pure
comparative negligence system is to afford recovery for all damages not
occasioned by the plaintiffs negligence. Therefore, a plaintiffs admis-
sion of his contributory negligence should serve only to reduce his
recovery from the other tortfeasors. A better solution would be a total
rejection of the "admission of contributory negligence" rule. The non-
settling tortfeasors should bear the burden of proving the plaintiff's
189. Id.
190. See CAL. CobB Civ. PROC. §877.
191. See Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614, 618, 43 P. 4, 5 (1895); Carr v. Cove, 33
Cal. App. 3d 851, 854, 109 Cal. Rptr. 449, 451 (1973); Reinach v. City & County of San
Francisco, 164 Cal. App. 2d 763, 768, 331 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1958).
192. See, e.g., Artucovich v. Arizmendiz, 256 Cal. App. 2d 130, 63 Cal. Rptr. 810
(1967); Louie Quierlo Trucking, Inc. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. App. 2d 194, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (1967); Sylvester v. Soulaberg, 252 Cal. App. 2d 185, 60 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1967); Rothrock v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 616, 43 Cal. Rptr. 716
(1965); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 343 P.2d 977 (1959). Contra Clovis
Ready Mix Co. v. Aetna Freight Lines, 25 Cal. App. 3d 276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1972);
Lea v. Shank, 5 Cal. App. 3d 964, 85 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1970). See Nellis, Avoiding
Collateral Estoppel in California Multiple T6rt Litigation, 9 CAL. W. L. Rnv. 115, 124
(1972).
193. See authorities cited note 192 supra.
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causal negligence, just as they would have had to do absent the settle-
ment.19
4
Some question is also raised as to whether the trier of fact should
consider a settling tortfeasor's negligence in the later suit.1 5 Three
important factors militate against this practice: (1) a release of a
settling tortfeasor is not a release of other tortfeasors;190 (2) the nonset-
fing tortfeasors are liable for the entire amount of plaintiff's recoverable
damages remaining after the settlement is deducted under the doctrine
of joint and several liability; and (3) the California contribution statute
generally precludes a contribution suit against a settling tortfeasor.1 07
Thus, the issue of a settling tortfeasor's negligence should be irrelevant
as there is no purpose served by considering it.
As noted above, the present California law precludes contribution
from a settling tortfeasor. 198 The only exception to this rule arises
where the settlement has been entered into in bad faith.1 9 Notwith-
standing the fact that this comment advocates both the rejection of the
joint judgment rule as a prerequisite to a suit for contribution and the
adoption of comparative contribution, 200 the present California law
regarding settling tortfeasors should remain in effect. The strong public
policy in favor of settlements will be compromised if contribution suits
are allowed, as tortfeasors settling in good faith would not be absolutely
protected from additional liability. Therefore, any proposed change of
this particular part of the contribution statute should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The Li decision adopting pure comparative negligence represents the
first step in the evolution of a truly equitable method of loss allocation
among all parties contributing in some measure to an injury. The
implementation of comparative negligence, .in its most basic application
to suits between a single plaintiff and a single defendant, is a relatively
simple procedure. First, the duty, breach of duty, legal causation,
damages, and proportionate fault of each person are assessed by the trier
of fact through specific findings. Second, a deduction from the plain-
tiff's total damages is made for those damages attributable solely to the
plaintiff's negligence.
194. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
195. See Pierrenger v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); SCHVrWAR7,
supra note 13, §16.5 at 255-56.
196. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §877.
197. CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. §877(b).
198. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §877(b).
199. See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §877.
200. See text accompanying notes 72-88 supra.
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In suits involving multiple parties, the basis of liability is the concept
of joint and several liability. Tortfeasors whose actions, either jointly,
concurrently, or successively, are a substantial factor in causing an
indivisible injury to the plaintiff may be sued either jointly or severally
for all damages not occasioned by the plaintiff's negligence. In multiple
party suits where all responsible parties are before the court, the same
basic procedure as that of the two party suit is applied. In cases where
one responsible person is not before the court, the plaintiff's negligence
should be compared against the combined negligence of all responsible
persons, regardless of whether all are parties. In cases where more than
one party has suffered damage, each should recover for all damages
caused by the combined activities of others, but with a setoff for any
amounts owed by him to the others.
Where all responsible persons are not before the court, or where all
issues are not resolved in a single proceeding, different considerations
arise. First, the existing California case law barring a plaintiff's recov-
ery in subsequent suits solely on the basis of this contributory negligence
should be discarded as a result of the adoption of comparative negli-
gence. Second, if the plaintiff in the subsequent proceeding did not
participate in the prior action, assuming that no new issues are presented,
he should be allowed to offensively assert the former judgment to fix the
liability of the defendants. A different result is reached if an issue not
litigated in the former suit is raised. In this situation, only the negli-
gence and not the proportionate fault of the defendants should be fixed
by the prior decision.
Contribution under a complete system of comparative negligence
should be determined on the basis of proportionate responsibility, not by
equally dividing the damages among the defendants. Additionally, a
defendant should be allowed to implead other responsible persons to
that end. Finally, contribution should not be limited to those cases
where a plaintiff has joined multiple defendants; if joint, concurrent, or
successive liability to the plaintiff can be established in a subsequent
suit, contribution should also be allowed. Due process, however, for-
bids making a prior finding of proportionate liability conclusive unless
the person absent from the prior proceeding waives his due process
objections.
The adoption of comparative negligence does not require legislative
reform of the procedural rules of joinder of parties as the interest in
providing compensation for a plaintiff does not compel the enactment of
a provision for mandatory joinder. Rather, the current contribution
statute should be reformed so as to provide for impleader and compara-
tive contribution.
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The introduction of a pure comparative negligence system in Califor-
nia does not signal a drastic change in the existing procedural and
substantive tort law. However, the California courts and legislature
must definitely reevaluate some of the existing doctrines in light of
comparative negligence. To provide some aid in this endeavor, the
following revisions to Section 1714 of the California Civil Code and
Section 875 of the California Code of Civil Procedure are proposed:
(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person,
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such
cases is defined by the title on compensatory relief.
(b) In all actions brought for personal injuries, or where such in-
juries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that
the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having
control over the property, may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be dimin-
ished by the trier of fact in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the property, or
the person having control over the property.
(c) If unreasonable delay or prejudice to the parties already be-
fore the court will not result, a defending party may cause a per-
son not a party to the proceeding to be made a party for purposes
of contribution if that person is alleged to be jointly, concurrently,
or successively liable with the defending party, for all or part of
the plaintiffs claim.
(d) When there are two or more persons who are jointly, concur-
rently, or successively liable, contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, pro-
vided, however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable
for the entire award.
(e) A cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a sepa-
rate proceeding whether or not an action has been brought or a
judgment has been rendered against the person from whom contri-
bution is sought. No claim for contribution may be asserted
against a tortfeasor who has in good faith obtained a release, dis-
missal with or without prejudice, or covenant not to sue from the
injured party.
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